The Absence of a Factual Conflict of Rights

Editorial Note:

This article is Part II of a nine-part series titled “Jural Relationships in the System of Reciprocal Duties.” While Part I laid the theoretical foundation by linking autonomy and duties towards oneself, this piece advances the discussion by examining non-conflictual jural relationships, particularly the absence of factual conflicts of rights through Hohfeld’s framework.

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We will distinguish between non-conflictual jural relationships, which contain elements that do not admit or require external legislation, but rather internal legislation, and conflictual jural relationships, which must be resolved in order to reestablish a peaceful state of no-right. We inquire into the role of the principle of individual autonomy in the context of non-conflictual jural relations, particularly in cases involving self-regarding acts.

A non-conflictual jural relationship can arise in three circumstances. As we will see below, the first occurs in the absence of a factual conflict of rights, i.e., when all other members of human society recognize the validity of an individual's claim and conform their conduct to the performance of the required obligation. This scenario aligns with Hohfeld's concept of privilege. The second scenario of a non-conflictual jural relationship arises in so-called self-regarding acts. The third possibility corresponds to a legal relationship of right-duty in the Hohfelian sense. In this case, a prima facie conflict of duties has been resolved, and the existence of a definite relationship of rights and duties has been established.

The Absence of a Factual Conflict of Rights

According to Hohfeld, a privilege is the opposite of a duty to refrain from doing something. «Alvin» has the privilege of entering on the land; that is, he has no duty to stay off.  Alf Ross adds that freedom means that «Alvin» has neither a duty to do something nor a duty to abstain.  Hohfeld's argument, which draws on the analogy with legal relations of individual rights and legal duties, asserts that the correlative of a privilege is a “no-right.” Therefore, the correlative of Alvin's privilege of entering himself is manifestly Beto's "no-right" that «Alvin» shall not enter. Privilege is then the freedom to do something at will because there is no contrary right of another. However, since the freedom of «Alvin» does not necessarily imply a duty of everyone not to interfere, Hohfeld rejects the possibility of claiming that the correlative of the freedom to do something is the duty of others not to interfere. 

Hohfeld's argument sought to refute the classical notion that the existence of freedom inherently entailed the imposition of a duty on others to refrain from interference.  In our analysis, we will disregard the notion that an individual's liberty rights are established through a relationship with the state (state action doctrine). However, it does not constitute an immediate horizontal relationship with another individual. Instead, it is regarded as a relationship with all members of society or, as Kant would say, a collective-universal (common) will. It only establishes a mediated relationship with an individual as part of the collective.

However, the representation of the legal relation of the privilege of «Alvin» to do «Z» as opposed to the no-right of «Beto» to demand from «Alvin» a contrary conduct «-Z» can lead to the error of supposing that we are dealing with an actual no-right, that is, the same type of no-right that is opposed to the legal right. Conversely, the legal right and the privilege belong to categories of a different nature.  While the legal right is part of an actual legal relationship, in which rules are established that regulate the conduct of two parties, the privilege is part of a prima facie jural relationship, in which the interests of the participants concur as principles or values. These prima facie rights are only considered definitive when there are no other, more compelling interests to consider.

This article is based on:

Espinoza Rausseo, A., & Rivas Alberti, J. (2026). Duties Towards Oneself and Self-Regarding Actions in the System of Reciprocal Duties. Mexican Law Review, 18(2), e20548. https://doi.org/10.22201/iij.24485306e.2026.2.20548