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The system of reciprocal duties

Editorial Note:

This article is Part I of a nine-part academic series titled “Jural Relationships in the System of Reciprocal Duties.” The series explores the philosophical and constitutional foundations of rights and duties, focusing on autonomy, will, and reciprocity in legal systems. Each part builds on the previous one to develop a comprehensive theoretical framework relevant to contemporary constitutional discourse.


We will argue that the sphere of duties towards oneself serves as the basis for the entire system of reciprocal duties. The prima facie duties towards oneself are the reasons that allow the conscience to act as an internal judge in order to comply with the duty. This process constitutes the initial step of a system of duties and rights based on the principle of autonomy. The self-determination of the individual constitutes the cornerstone of a system of duties and rights across various levels corresponding to the individual, social, and public spheres. From those premises, rational individuals can determine their own ends and exercise free will. 


An individual's will, free from external coercion, is a fundamental component of individual rights. From this perspective, subjective rights can be seen as the external expression of duties towards oneself. Once an individual has autonomously chosen their maxim of will, the function of individual right acts as the execution of that will and is directed against the social will, to make the individual will a prima facie duty of all people. Therefore, the effects of an individual`s action are not limited to the internal sphere but are part of complex reciprocal relationships regarding rights and duties towards others. 


Pufendorf defines freedom as “the intrinsic faculty of doing or omitting what one judges for oneself”. This concept is also central to Kant's conception of the innate right to freedom. According to Kant, freedom can be defined as “independence from being constrained by another's choice (Willkür)”, insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of any other according to a universal law. The theory of will is rooted in this concept of freedom. A subjective right is defined as the power or sphere of the will of the individual. In our opinion, the determination of ends, grounded in reasons for duties towards oneself, is inextricably linked to the will, which is intrinsic to subjective rights and serves as the foundation for the entire system of reciprocal duties.


The internal process of autonomous determination of the individual's maxim of will is expressed externally through conduct protected by the right of freedom. The individual right then serves as the execution of the will. According to Kant, “When I declare (by word or deed), I will that something external is to be mine, I thereby declare that everyone else is under obligation to refrain from using that object of my choice, an obligation no one would have were it not for this act of mine to establish a right”. 


The act of choice is mandatory, based on the principle of reciprocity, which means that “the limitation that I place on the actions of others in relation to myself implies a like restriction of my actions in relation to them”. This creates an internal obligation that corresponds to the external obligation. In contrast to the will of the individual, Kant conceives the existence of an a priori unified will (vereinigten Wille) or collective-general (common) will (kollektiv-allgemeiner (gemeinsamer) Wille).

It can be affirmed a priori that the equivalent element to the will in the individual sphere is the social will in the social sphere, in the same way that individual interests are equivalent to social interests and the individual rights to social or societal rights. In this way, the individual right is directed against social will, making the individual will a prima facie duty of all. 


This article is based on:

Espinoza Rausseo, A., & Rivas Alberti, J. (2026). Duties Towards Oneself and Self-Regarding Actions in the System of Reciprocal Duties. Mexican Law Review, 18(2), e20548. https://doi.org/10.22201/iij.24485306e.2026.2.20548


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