Manifest Arbitrariness and Article 14: Cure or Constitutional Drift?

Authored by Divija Manaktala, a 2nd-year student at Maharashtra National Law University, Mumbai

Supreme Court of India

Introduction

Article 14 of the Indian Constitution guarantees equality before the law and the equal protection of laws. The doctrine of reasonable classification has been used for decades to give operational meaning to this guarantee in judicial practice. However, as constitutional adjudication progressed, it faced an even more intractable problem: laws and state acts that, although formally equal in classification, sink into a state of substantive injustice. The Supreme Court responded with the doctrine of arbitrariness, which was later developed into the doctrine of manifest arbitrariness. This restructuring of the domestic discipline to which Article 14 had always been devoted is destabilised, however, in the name of an extension of egalitarianism. By allowing the doctrine of manifest arbitrariness to splinter into the normative appeal of Article 14 to become a discretionary judicial veto.

This piece presents a precise thesis statement: although manifest arbitrariness helps enhance Article 14's ability to correct substantive injustice, it should be regulated and not used on a broad scale, as it may undermine the structure of constitutional discipline and disrupt the balance in the separation of powers. The value of the doctrine must rather be regarded in the exactness with which its limits are delimited. Without any sense of principle in delimiting it, manifest arbitrariness threatens to turn Article 14's promise of equality into a blanket authorisation for the courts to review the prudence of legislative judgment.

The Classical Nucleus of Article 14

Article 14 essentially involves two concepts: the former must be viewed as interrelated; the latter is the idea of equality before the law, a negative concept based on Dicey's rule of law, warning against arbitrariness in the executive. The second one, equal protection of the laws, is an affirmative duty grounded in the United States Constitution and requires that the State treat similarly situated persons equally. In India, these strands were balanced by the courts through the adoption of the doctrine of reasonable classification, which crystallised in ground-breaking cases, including State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar. The classification that passes the test should be based on an intelligible differentia and should have a rational nexus to the object of the law.

This framework contained two strengths. First, it subjected judicial review to a disciplined form by demanding the reasons and form. Second, it did not violate the separation of powers, as it authorised legislative options without exceeding constitutional limits. However, its weaknesses were felt. Many wrongs occurred not due to the open classification but haphazard design, unreasonable discretion, or even simple legislative overambition.

Classification and Arbitrariness

Dissatisfaction with classification reached its apex with the Maneka Gandhi rulings, in which the Court imbued Articles 14, 19, and 21 with a common-sense understanding of fairness and reasonableness. An act by a State that was described as arbitrary was considered to be, by its very nature, subversive to Article 14, and therefore, the executive acts were invalidated by the courts when they were irrational even in the absence of a definite comparator.

However, when taken as a ground in isolation, the concept of arbitrariness poses conceptual challenges. H. M. Seervai notoriously rejected it, saying it hung in the air and was not attached to the text of Article 14. In contrast to classificatory tests, arbitrariness does not provide any yardstick within itself; what is arbitrary is usually a matter of judicial intuition, leading to subjectivity and unpredictability.

The Manifest Arbitrariness Emergence

The scandal escalated when the Supreme Court found “manifest arbitrariness,” a view widely expressed in Shayara Bano v. Union of India. The Court stated that it could strike down legislation, however, which was capricious, irrational or which had no sufficient determining principle on its surface. The doctrine was introduced as a restricted and self-evident norm, which was differentiated from ordinary arbitrariness.

This was a sharp doctrinal change. Previous cases include State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell, which warned that no law could be struck down on the ground that it is arbitrary. Shayara Bano regarded such a restraint as incuriam and reinstated the opportunity for substantive review of legislative wisdom under Article 14.

Why does the Doctrine have a Normative Appeal?

The beauty of manifest arbitrariness could not be disputed. It empowers the courts to deal with formally equal statutes that are substantively cruel, excessive or that do not pertain to constitutional morality. A strictly classificatory analysis may seem mechanical and morally shallow when applied to dignity, gender justice, or personal autonomy. Manifest arbitrariness gives language to address laws shocking to the conscience without artificially comparing them.

The Constitutional Cost

The doctrine entails significant constitutional risks, despite its pleasant appeal. To begin with, it creates a grey area between legislative review and administrative review. Arbitrariness and reasonableness have long been the subject of administrative action because of its discretionary nature, and legislation reflects the policy decisions of a representative institution. Applying the same arbitrary standard to both groups would pose a danger to the court process, turning courts into super-legislatures.

Second, manifest arbitrariness lacks a clear demarcation. The claim that arbitrariness can be determined on its face is deceptive. It is usually a profound normative inquiry to determine that a law lacks a sufficiently determinative principle, as even Shayara Bano itself exemplifies. This subverts any view that the doctrine is even limited or special.

Third, the doctrine conflicts with Article 13. The Constitution already provides a well-defined mechanism to nullify statutes that violate basic rights. To broaden Article 14 to general legislative unreasonableness is to run a risk of skirting around the systematic examination that Part III recommends.

Lessons of Elsewhere: A Comparative Glance

Comparative experience underscores these concerns. In the United States, substantive due process has been criticised because it allows courts to strike down legislation on disputed grounds of reasonableness. Judicial review in the United Kingdom through proportionality review has expanded, yet it is pegged on the rights and valid objectives. The manifest arbitrariness doctrine in India, in turn, is used as a free-standing tool of equality, which might be more intrusive than that.

Towards a Principled Middle Way

The difficulty, then, is not to forget about concerns of arbitrariness but to constitutionalise it responsibly. The first potential solution is to limit manifest arbitrariness to exceptional cases in which the legislation is internally incoherent, self-contradictory, or simply excessive with respect to its stated purpose. The other is to incorporate arbitrariness into a sophisticated proportionality analysis, enabling structured reasoning rather than intuitive condemnation.

More importantly, the courts should define the boundaries of what constitutes a given arbitrariness under the Constitution, rather than simply labelling it as undesirable. This involves rejoining Article 14 to its main interests in equality and non-domination, rather than treating it as a generic charter of good governance.

Conclusion

Article 14 has changed an outlaw rule prohibiting class legislation into a strong tool of substantive constitutional review. The manifest arbitrariness doctrine is the ambition of this evolution, alongside its anxiety. It is a judicial urge to dispense justice outside the formal predicates, and, in the same breath, it jeopardises the dilution of the discipline that lends constitutional adjudication legitimacy. The fate of Article 14 depends on the possibility of the courts to employ the moral power of arbitrariness without abandoning themselves to its indeterminacy.

Equality, however, requires not only equality in result, but moderation in means. In constitutional adjudication, legitimacy does not depend solely on achieving just results; it also depends on the use of principled, limited procedures. The danger of undermining that legitimacy is presented by an ungrounded exercise of manifest arbitrariness, which takes the place of the arbitrariness of judicial intuition with the strictness of constitutional government. The moral weight of the doctrine may be retained without compromising democratic legitimacy through a considered, limited use of it, in cases of apparent incoherence, disproportionality, or an open display of equality-denying extravagance.

In conclusion, Article 14 cannot be recast as an abstract signifier of good governance without losing its constitutional character. Constitutional equality necessitates caution towards injustice and, at the same time, maintains devotion to institutional boundaries. It is in this sense that the future of manifest arbitrariness, therefore, should not lie in its irresponsible multiplication but in its accurate, calibrated containment.