Conflictual Jural Relationships
- Ayush Kumar
- Jan 26
- 5 min read
📝 Editorial Note:
This article is part of an ongoing 8-part scholarly series titled “Jural Relationships in the System of Reciprocal Duties,” accompanied by an introductory index post. The series examines the philosophical and legal foundations of rights as correlative to duties, drawing on Hohfeldian analysis and Kantian theory to unpack the structure of modern legal relationships. This particular piece focuses on conflictual jural relationships, analysing situations where competing prima facie rights collide and must be resolved through principled reasoning across private, social, and public spheres.
🔗 Index:
Non-conflictual jural relationships
From Self-Regarding Acts to the Model of Spheres
[Case 3: Dinner with friends] Alvin has organized a dinner party for friends. However, he has decided to exclude Beto based on discriminatory grounds. Beto insists on his right to be invited.
[Case 4: Private school] Alvin is the proprietor of a private school that has decided to exclude Beto on discriminatory grounds. Beto insists on his right to be admitted.
[Case 5: Private town] Alvin has decided to exclude Beto from a town he owns due to the nature of Beto's ideas. Beto insists on his right not to be prevented from expressing his opinion on sidewalks that are open to the public.
We will assume that Alvin's conduct does not affect any other social interest. All participants are competent adults, well informed, capable of acting rationally, and free from undue pressure.
Conflictual jural relationships arise from a factual conflict of prima facie opposing rights. In determining their own ends, Alvin and Beto desire something that is mutually exclusive. Both have chosen to do «Z», and their conduct expresses the exercise of a right of defense not to be prevented from doing «Z».
This is a situation equivalent to the Hobbesian state of nature: “if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies...”. Kant also recognizes that this is a factual relationship between one person and another, “insofar as their actions, as facts, can have (direct or indirect) influence on each other”. According to Fichte, the freedom of two rational beings cannot be in conflict with each other. Rather, a conflict between them only arises when one makes use of their freedom in a manner contrary to law and duty, with the intention of oppressing the freedom of another. As a result, the factual conflict between prima facie opposing rights is followed by a conflict of prima facie social duties, by virtue of the social will, that is, a collective-universal (common) will.
In cases 3 and 4, Alvin's prima facie duty to himself to exclude others is opposed (‹›) to his own prima facie social duty not to interfere with Beto's prima facie right:
In Case 5, Alvin's prima facie duty to himself to exclude others, conflicts (‹›) with his own prima facie social duty not to interfere with Beto's prima facie right and with his prima facie public duty not to interfere with the free market of ideas. Beto has a right to defense as an individual, as a member of civilized society, and as a member of a democratic society:
And in cases 3, 4 and 5, Beto also faces a conflict of prima facie duties. Beto's prima facie duty to himself is opposed (‹›) to his own prima facie social duty not to interfere with Alvin's prima facie right to property:
The conflict is resolved in the first instance in the internal forum through a judgment that weighs the conflictual duties. The result may also be subject to external review, as far as it does not refer only to a conflict of prima facie duties towards himself but to the determination of the fulfillment of social or public duties. The resolution of a conflictual jural relationship, through the determination of the actual rights and duties of the parties, gives rise to a non-conflictual legal relationship:
In his private sphere (Case 3), Alvin has an actual right to exclude Beto, despite Beto's insistence on being invited to a dinner with friends. According to the concurring opinion of Judge Harlan II in Peterson v. City of Greenville (1963), we must recognize the preferential value of Alvin's prima facie right to “...chose his associates or his neighbors, to use and dispose of his property as he sees fit, to be irrational, arbitrary, capricious, even unjust in his personal relations.” Alvin has a no-duty to refrain and the actual right to exclude Beto from his residence. Alvin's right is correlated with Beto's duty to stay off the property and is opposed to the Beto's social no-right to be invited.
In the social sphere (Case 4), Alvin has no right to exclude Beto from the private school he owns on discriminatory grounds and has a social duty to admit Beto. Beto has an actual right to be admitted to Alvin's school and no duty to refrain from entering. Beto's right correlated with Alvin's duty to admit him, and it is opposed to Alvin's no-right to exclude Beto.
In the public sphere (Case 5), Alvin has no right to exclude Beto and a social and public duty to allow him to enter. Beto has an actual right not to be prevented from expressing his opinion on the sidewalks of a private town owned by Alvin, and he also has no social duty to refrain. Beto's right to enter is correlated (~) with Alvin's duty to allow access to the property. It is also opposed (‹›) to Alvin's no-right to prevent expressive activities of public relevance in areas of free public access.
Actual rights and duties establish non-conflictual relationships. The right of the active subject is opposed to the no-right, and the duty of the passive subject is its correlate. This determination results from resolving a prima facie conflict of duties.
In the private sphere, Alvin's duty to defend his privacy (>) prevails over his social duty of non-discrimination. In the social and public spheres, however, Alvin's duty to society and the public prevails over his duty to himself to defend his privacy. The holder of the actual right has the power to decide whether to enforce the obligation. However, as we have seen, will is not limited to freely disposing of the right; it has a broader function in determining ends through internal judgment.
This article is based on:
Espinoza Rausseo, A., & Rivas Alberti, J. (2026). Duties Towards Oneself and Self-Regarding Actions in the System of Reciprocal Duties. Mexican Law Review, 18(2), e20548. https://doi.org/10.22201/iij.24485306e.2026.2.20548
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