Authored by Narayani Khanna, a first-year law student at Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab Representational Image/AI-Enhanced On 11 December 2017, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting issued what seemed to be an ‘advisory’. A single-page advisory that made it through 9 years unaltered, unfettered. It directed all television channels that advertisements for condoms “which are for a particular age group and could be indecent/inappropriate for viewing by children” must air only between 10:00 PM and 6:00 AM. It closed with a sentence that, “Any failure will attract action as per provisions of the Rules.” That sentence sits anachronistically with the very label of an advisory. It is a prohibition wrapped around in deceptive paraphernalia. The 2017 condom advisory, read against the regulatory architecture it purports to apply, is a case study in three compounding defects: a. a constitutional standard that clearly does not exist yet still is enforced, b. a procedure that was not followed and a legal framework so internally contradictory that the same content can be simultaneously permitted and c. banned depending entirely on which screen you watch it on. Read Also - 'The Role of Governors in Centre-State Relations: Unraveling the Complex Web of Influence' The Procedure: The One Based on Whims Before one can scrutinise the advisory in question, it must be determined whether it was issued by a legitimate authority. The Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995 provides two mechanisms for restricting content. Section 19 permits an “authorised officer” to prohibit the transmission of a programme or channel if it is not in conformity with the prescribed codes or is “likely to... promote disharmony.” Section 20 empowers the Central Government to do the same, and Rule 6(7), inserted by the 2011 amendment, requires that before any such prohibition order is passed, the operator must be given “an opportunity of hearing.” The relevant portion is as follows: “19. Power to prohibit transmission of certain programmes in public interest. — Where [any authorised officer] thinks it necessary or expedient so to do in the public interest…….. 20. Power to prohibit operation of cable television network in public interest. — [1] Where the Central Government thinks it necessary or expedient so to do in public interest, it may prohibit the operation of any cable television network in such areas as it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf… Rule 6(7): where the Central Government is satisfied that the programme of any channel is not in conformity with the Programme Code, it may, after giving an opportunity of hearing to the cable operator, and by an order in writing, prohibit the transmission or re-transmission of any such channel or programme in accordance with the provisions of section 20 of the Act.” The 2017 advisory on paper followed the Section 20 pathway; however, it sought to impose a blanket ban across India based on complaints received from the Maharashtra State Commission for Women. Section 20 confines the Central Government's power to areas it “may... specify” by notification, contemplating a geographically delimited exercise of power rather than an automatic pan-India application. The advisory records no reasoning connecting complaints localised to Maharashtra with a decision to extend prohibition to the entirety of India, and the absence of any stated nexus between the scope of the grievance and the scope of the remedy renders the territorial overreach unexplained on the face of the instrument itself. Read Also - 'Is Hijab Ban in Educational Institutions Unconstitutional?' Even in furtherance of Rule 6(7), no show-cause notice was issued. No broadcaster was afforded a hearing. No channel was told which specific advertisement had violated which specific provision. The Rajya Sabha's own reply to Unstarred Question No. 1516 confirmed that no expert consultation had been conducted to establish any link between condom advertising and harm to children. The Advertising Standards Council of India's Consumer Complaints Council had recommended the restriction following public complaints, and the Ministry, “after due consideration of ASCI's recommendation,” issued the advisory. That is the entire evidentiary and procedural record available to the public and probably the only one that exists. The Supreme Court in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020) held that any restriction on speech must be necessary and proportionate, be issued by a reasoned order, and be open to judicial review. None of these conditions was met. The advisory was issued without a content-specific finding and without any process that would permit challenge before the restriction took effect. The Blanket Ban: No Content Specific Scrutiny but a Punishment for All The advisory cited Rules 7(7) and 7(8) of the Cable Television Networks Rules, 1994 as its statutory basis. Rule 7(7) prohibits advertisements that “endanger the safety of children or create in them any interest in unhealthy practices.” Rule 7(8) prohibits “indecent, vulgar, suggestive, repulsive or offensive themes or treatment” in all advertisements. Neither provision supports what the advisory actually did. Rule 7(7) is about the content of an advertisement and its specific effect on children. It does not declare any product inherently unsuitable for advertising. Rule 7(8) is about creative treatment, the manner in which a product is presented. It does not render a product category off-limits, regardless of how particular advertisements for it are executed. What the advisory imposed was a product-category ban: the mere fact that a product was a condom triggered the restriction, with no inquiry into whether any individual advertisement was, in fact, indecent, vulgar, or suggestive of unhealthy practices. The advisory's internal logic makes the problem explicit. It states that “some channels carry advertisements of condoms repeatedly which are alleged to be indecent” and then proceeds to advise that all condom advertisements be restricted to late-night hours. The reasoning moves from “some advertisements are problematic” to “therefore restrict all advertisements for this product,” a syllogistic leap that no proportionality analysis could sustain. The Honourable Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there must be a nexus between the objective sought and the means employed to achieve it. If the objective was to safeguard children from the dis-impact certain condom advertisements are claimed to have, banning the entire product category is nothing less than disproportionate. The logic has no principle behind it; it has a product category behind it, and the choice of that product category tells us rather more about the Ministry's moral preferences than about the Rules it purports to apply. The subsequent Rajya Sabha response, the most anticipated, served no real purpose. The Ministry clarified that “advertisements on safe sex without sexually objectifying women and/or without carrying sexually explicit content... may be continued to be promoted”, a clarification specifically made to the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. The clarification was reactive, not anterior. It arrived under pressure from a Rajasthan High Court notice, not from prior legal deliberation. The original advisory remained in force as drafted. And because it imposed a blanket product-category restriction rather than a content-type restriction, a condom advertisement that said nothing more than “use protection” was, on the advisory's face, equally prohibited. All sorts of advertisements relating to condoms stood banned, even if not explicitly; the brands withdrew from the idea of airing one. More than what was banned on the perverse, it became a ban on all, creating an environment of confusion, apprehension, and terror. Read Also - 'The Language of Oppression: A Human Rights Crisis Where Speaking Bengali Can Cost You Your Freedom' The Population Foundation of India identified the correct approach in December 2017 itself: advertisements, like films, can be graded by content and slotted accordingly. A condom advertisement with no sexually explicit content could air freely; one with adult content could carry a scheduling restriction tied to that content. However, the Ministry chose a blunter instrument, and that instrument has remained in effect as a de facto permanent restriction, despite the Act's own language indicating that executive powers to restrict content were designed to apply only in very specific circumstances. The Definition That Undermines Itself There is a structural contradiction within the Cable Television Networks Act that has attracted less attention than it deserves. Section 2(g) of the Act defines “programme” as “any television broadcast and includes, (i) exhibition of films, features, dramas, advertisements.” Advertisements are, by the Act's own definition, a species of programme. Considering that, one would expect them to be regulated under Rule 6 of the Programme Code, yet the Rules instead prescribe Rule 7, a separate Advertising Code relating to advertisements. Rule 6 prohibits programmes that offend “good taste or decency,” while Rule 7(1) requires conformity to the law and not “offend morality, decency and religious susceptibilities.” The problem here is that the addition of the ‘Good Taste’ standard is not only legally unfounded and not a legitimate restriction on freedom of speech, but also that there appears to be no compelling reason to introduce it, because the definition of ‘Good Taste’ remains unclear either way. Therefore, the standards are not identical, and the structural segregation creates its own anomalies. Aside from the commercial and potentially exploitative nature of advertisements, there is no inherent reason to separate the two. Advertisements certainly require strict, specialised standards given their commercial nature, but their core restrictions should still align with the Programme Code, as there exists no intelligible difference between the two except as stated above. To our dismay, current regulations fail to maintain this consistency. The Selective Enforcement That Reveals the Real Standard Rule 7(2)(vi) of the Cable Television Networks Rules states that “no advertisement shall be permitted which projects a derogatory image of women,” that “women must not be portrayed in a manner that emphasises passive, submissive qualities,” and that “the portrayal of the female form... shall be tasteful and aesthetic, and within the well-established norms of good taste and decency.” This provision has been systematically underenforced. Advertisements that deploy women as unrelated aesthetic instruments to sell products from automotive paint to construction materials, that promote fairness products on the premise that lighter skin confers social worth, and that cast women exclusively in domestic or dependent roles continue to air in prime time without the regulatory intervention that Rule 7(2)(vi) would require. The same Code that was mobilised, through advisory, to restrict a health product to late-night hours contains an express prohibition on gender-derogatory advertising that attracts no equivalent enforcement. This is not an accidental gap. It reveals that the elastic standard of “good taste” is not applied neutrally. It is applied selectively, to restrict content the executive finds morally inconvenient, while leaving unrestricted content that more clearly violates the Code's stated values. The Rajasthan High Court, which dismissed the petition against the condom advisory, confirmed this pattern rather than correcting it: it held that the advertisements were “so obscene that one cannot watch them in Indian social structure with their family”, applying an uncritical moral-cultural judgment in place of proportionality analysis, without asking whether the stated aim of child protection was achieved proportionately, without asking whether the restriction was the least restrictive means available, and without engaging with the NACO-aligned public health case for condom communication at all. The Screen That Decides the Standard The most structurally untenable aspect of the present framework is one that the 2017 advisory did not create but that its continued operation makes vivid. Under the IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, publishers of online curated content must self-classify all content into five age-based categories, U, U/A 7+, U/A 13+, U/A 16+, and A, display those ratings before content commences, implement parental locks for content classified U/A 13+ or above, and maintain age verification mechanisms for adult content. The MIB advisory of July 2023 extended this framework to promotional and publicity material, directing OTT publishers to include age-classification ratings in all print, television, and online promotional content. The Central Board of Film Certification revised its own certification system in October 2024 to align with this framework. No equivalent exists for advertising on cable television. There is no age-classification requirement for television advertisements, nor a content descriptor obligation. Read Also - 'Social Justice vs. Constitutionalism: India’s Democratic Dilemma?' The consequence is a regulatory asymmetry that is constitutionally difficult to defend. Consider this: a film streaming on Netflix carrying an A-rating can, under the 2021 Rules, include a promotional trailer similarly classified; that trailer must carry its classification rating and may be preceded by an age-verification prompt. The same film's theatrical trailer, if aired as a cable television advertisement, falls under the Programme and Advertising Codes, where no age-classification regime applies. A condom advertisement with informational content and no sexually explicit material is, on the cable television side, restricted to midnight by an advisory but on an OTT platform, it could theoretically appear as a U or U/A 7+ classified promotional communication without any scheduling constraint. The medium of transmission, not the content, determines the regulatory outcome. That is a grave regulatory incoherence. The Reform the Withdrawn Bill Did Not Offer The Draft Broadcasting Services (Regulation) Bill, 2023, and its 2024 revision, both now withdrawn, proposed replacing the 1995 Act. The proposals acknowledged, at least in structure, the convergence between broadcast and digital media. They introduced Content Evaluation Committees and a statutory penalty tier. What they did not do was define “good taste,” replace it with a harm-minimisation standard, or introduce an age-classification system for advertising. The Programme Code was carried forward without definitional content. The proposals were withdrawn following industry opposition in August 2024. As of June 2026, no revised draft exists. The persistence of the gap is not explained by legislative complexity. Way Forward Three specific reforms follow from the analysis above. First, Rule 6(1)(a) should be amended to remove “good taste” as an operative standard. Any restriction beyond “decency or morality”, as judicially defined through the community standards test, requires independent constitutional grounding that presently does not exist. Second, the advisory mechanism should be replaced with a formal, tiered enforcement process requiring a content-specific finding, a show-cause notice, a hearing, and a reasoned order, the procedural architecture that Sections 19 and 20 of the existing Act already contemplate for formal prohibition orders, but which advisory practice systematically bypasses. Third, a mandatory age-classification system for television advertising, aligned with the OTT framework and the CBFC's revised certification categories, should replace the present void. The Population Foundation of India proposed this in 2017. Ofcom implements it through its watershed. The AANA's Children's Advertising Code protects children without product bans. None of these approaches requires “good taste” to do anything at all. What the 2017 condom advisory ultimately exposes is not a failure of administrative discretion in a single instance. It is the accumulated cost of a regulatory architecture that has not been revised in substance since 1994, that contains a constitutionally indefensible vagueness standard, that permits shadow enforcement without procedural safeguards, that defines advertisements as programmes and then applies a separate and inconsistent code to them, and that assigns regulatory outcomes based on transmission medium rather than content. In an era of media convergence, where the same video can be a restricted advertisement on cable television, a classified promotional clip-on OTT, and a permitted programme segment on cable if its advertiser simply repackages it, the medium has become the standard. That is not what the Constitution had in mind.

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